14 Therefore, the GFA, as a common and reciprocal redefinition of British and Irish public sovereignty over Northern Ireland, was a remarkably incomplete and unfinished constitutional process. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom and its border problem in Ireland show that the 1998 agreement did not go far enough to provide for an explicit, indisputable and constitutional (new) definition of the Dublin and London obligations as the sovereign guarantee of the agreement. Regardless of northern Ireland`s constitutional status within the United Kingdom or part of a united Ireland, the right of the „people of Northern Ireland“ to „accept themselves as Irish or British or both“ (as well as their right to british or Irish nationality or both) has been recognized. The words „people of Northern Ireland“ means „all persons who were born in Northern Ireland and who have at least one relative at the time of their birth, who is a British national, who is irish national or who has the right to stay in Northern Ireland without limitation of their stay“ [11] 3 This document is divided into three parts. The first part will show that the current soft regime of the Irish border is inseparable from and dependent on the political and constitutional compromise of 1998, excluding any solution that would be purely commercial and/or technical. Any soft or hard changes in the way border control functions are carried out necessarily destabilizes the political and institutional balance found in 1998, in particular, but not only, in the second part of the GFA. Therefore, the difficulty of the irish border problem after Brexit also lies in the GFA itself. The next two parts focus successively on two major weaknesses of the GFA that make this difficulty. The second part will show that the GFA, even if it were a sign of a substantial improvement in Anglo-Irish relations facilitated by the European context, has not introduced a definitive and consensual constitutional definition of the rights and obligations of Dublin and London as guarantors of the GFA.

The third part will show that the first part of the GFA, which establishes the creation of consozie institutions in Northern Ireland, has maintained and reinforced sectarian polarisation, making it impossible for a Community consensus on the status of the Irish border issue. Although there was a 56% majority for remains in Northern Ireland and Unionists and nationalists in general tend to support the current system of soft borders, both communities still have undeniable political and territorial plans. Although Consocian democracy has brought peace and stability to Northern Ireland, it has failed to change ethno-local identities.